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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
(1) defendant must be brought to trial within the same term of
court in which the indictment is filed, or within the next succeeding
term of a court competent to try him, and (2) unless good cause is
shown by the state for failure to bring defendant to trial within
this period, this statute shall operate as a bar to future prosecution
for offenses arising out of facts alleged in the indictment. This
proposed statute would not operate as a "sword for the defendant,'31
for the General Assembly is able to draft initially, and subsequently
revise as necessary, the time limitations to reflect the current ability
of the state's courts, acting with reasonable diligence, to bring per-
sons to trial. That period at any given time might be longer than
two terms of court. At any rate, Klopfer makes clear that an outer
limit of some type, however determined, is necessary.
So much for the law. In reality, Klopfer has not yet had his
trial. He attempted to have the case removed to federal court under
procedures recently outlined by the United States Supreme Court for
cases arising out of civil rights disputes.82 But the federal district
court declined to take jurisdiction on November 17, 1967, stating
that the state court should be given another chance to dismiss the
indictment.
WILLIAM S. GEImER
Constitutional Law-Defamation under the First Amendment-
The Actual Malice Test and "Public Figures"
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivai' the United States Supreme
Court held that "a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open"2 was such that in certain cases libelous misstatements
of fact were qualifiedly protected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. In granting this constitutional protection to misstatements
of fact,8 the Court held that the protection was for critics of the
" State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 542, 139 S.E.2d 870, 875 (1965).
" Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); Greenwood v. Peacock, 384
U.S. 808 (1966).
'New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2Id. at 270.
'The Court expressly adopted the minority view. 376 U.S. at 280 & 281.
See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908); Ponder
v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 358
(1944).
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official conduct of public officials4 but that it did not extend to a
libelous statement made with "actual malice-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not."" Failure to show that plaintiff was a public official or proof
of actual malice destroyed the protection.
Much discussion and debate followed the New York Times
decision concerning how far the constitutional protection was to
be extended.6 In response to this uncertainty, the Court granted
certiorari in two cases to decide whether the first amendment pro-
tects "public figures" as well as public officials and if so, when the
protection was to be lost.7  Case No. 150, Associated Press v.
Walker was a libel action arising out of newspaper accounts con-
cerning the integration riots of September 30, 1962, at the Univer-
sity of Mississippi.' Case No. 37, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
arose out of an article published in the Saturday Evening Post9
which falsely accused the athletic director of the University of
Georgia of having conspired to "fix" a college football game.'
In deciding these two cases all members of the Court agreed that
the first amendment qualifiedly protects libelous misstatements of
fact made about "public figures" as well as those concerning public
officials. 1 There was disagreement, however, over the test to be
employed in determining the proof necessary to destroy the consti-
tutional protection. 2 Five members of the Court applied the "actual
malice" test of New York Times and reversed Walker because there
'376 U.S. at 283.
r376 U.S. at 279.
'Hanson, Developments in the Law of Libel: Impact of the New York
Times Rule, 7 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 215 (1966); Comment, New York
Times v. Sullivan: The Public Official and The Public Figure, 30 ALBANY
L. REV. 316 (1966); Note, 42 U. WASH. L. REv. 654 (1967).
SCurtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
Id. at 140.
o SATURDAY EVENING POST, March 23, 1963, at 80.
10 388 U.S. at 135.
"1388 U.S. at 131-33 (syllabus). In thus extending the constitutional
protection to "public figures," however, the Court failed to give a concrete
standard for determining when a person was a "public figure." This inter-
esting point is beyond the scope and purpose of this note. For discussion
of who constitutes a public official see, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75
(1966); Note, 46 BOSTON U. L. REV. 568 (1966); Note, 52 CORNELL L.Q.
419 (1967); Note, 39 TEMp. L.Q. 510 (1966).
" The first two parts of the opinion of Chief justice Warren constituted
the only majority opinion by the Court. 388 U.S. at 164. The four justices
who concurred in this part of his opinion disagreed with the last half of
the opinion, two of them dissenting on grounds other than the question of
reckless disregard. 388 U.S. at 172.
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was no proof of actual malice.13 In Butts, however, two of these
concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show the degree of
reckless disregard necessary to defeat the constitutional protection
while the remaining three thought it was sufficient. 4 The remaining
four members of the Court voted to reverse Walker and to affirm
Butts5 arguing, however, that "the rigorous federal requirements
of New York Times are not the only appropriate accommodation
of the conflicting interests at stake."'0 Instead they felt that the
public figure should be able to recover on "a showing of highly un-
reasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to
by responsible publishers.' 7  The conflict in these opinions raises
the question of whether the proof required to defeat the constitu-
tional protection is to be less rigorous where public figures rather
than public officials are involved.
The actual malice test as promulgated in New York Times is
a two part test. The first half of the test, actual knowledge of the
falsity of a statement, is easily applied.' It is in determining
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the statement that
problems arise. From the very nature of the test it can be seen
that a determination of reckless disregard will involve many fac-
tors.'" Cases which present the question, however, frequently in-
volve wide publication of a statement, the falsity of which could
have been discovered prior to publication by a more thorough inves-
tigation."0 Thus the effect of the degree of investigation upon the
determination of reckless disregard may often be important. To
analyze this test under New York Times and Butts it is necessary
to look at the specific factors the courts have found relevant.
In New York Times, the defendant newspaper published a
paid advertisement which supported the civil rights movement in
" 388 U.S. at 164.1 388 U.S. at 170-71.
15 388 U.S. at 133.
"6 388 U.S. at 155.
17388 U.S. at 155.
" Fox v. Kahn, 421 Pa. 563, 221 A.2d 181 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
935 (1966).
"o It is clear that many factors have an effect upon the amount of investi-
gation required. Some of these factors are: (1) The time lag between the
occurrence of an alleged fact and its publication (is it "hot" news?); (2)
The degree to which the publication is clearly defamatory; (3) Notice of
probable falsity of the statement.
"°E.g., Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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Alabama. Several false statements were made about the activities
of the Montgomery, Alabama, police department which plaintiff,
the head of the department, claimed defamed him by innuendo. The
Court held that the failure of defendant to investigate the validity
of the statements before publication was "constitutionally insuffi-
cient" to show reckless disregard.21 A clearer example of what
the Court required for proof of reckless disregard in the case of
public officials is found in Garrison v. Louisiana.2" There the Dis-
trict Attorney of Orleans Parrish, Louisiana, was convicted under
a Louisiana criminal libel statute for falsely accusing eight local
judges of misconduct in office and dereliction of duty. The Su-
preme Court held, in striking down the statute as unconstitutional,
that the trial court's finding that the statements were made with
personal malice and without reasonable grounds to believe them
true23 was not sufficient to show reckless disregard because even
where personal malice is present, defeasance of the protection can
not be based on unreasonableness or mere negligence.24 Thus, it
seems that the reckless disregard test, as applied to public officials
in these two cases, is a stringent test, almost the equivalent of re-
quiring culpable knowledge.25
Although Garrison is the only post-New York Times decision
by the Supreme Court that gives a further definitive showing of
what would constitute reckless disregard in libel actions, several
other courts have interpreted the standard, often in terms of inves-
tigation. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in applying
the test stated: "While verification of the facts remains an im-
portant reporting standard, a reporter, without a 'high degree of
awareness of their probable falsity,' may rely on statements made
by a single source even though they reflect only one side of the
story without fear of libel prosecution by public official."2 6 Where
a reporter for defendant newspaper wrote a story falsely accusing
plaintiff, a justice of the peace, and his daughter of trying cases
without jurisdiction, the fact that the reporter failed to make a
21 376 U.S. at 265.
' 379 U.S. 64 (1964).22 State v. Garrison, 244 La. 787, 154 So. 2d 400 (1963).
2 379 U.S. at 79.
2 At least one state court has interpreted it this way, stating that
"[R]eckless disregard must be the equivalent of the 'calculated falsehood'
.... " Pauling v. National Review, 49 Misc. 2d 975, 981, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11, 19
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
" New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1966).
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single check of the court records for verification was held insufficient
to show reckless disregard of the truth.17  By contrast, where de-
fendant magazine published an article which was based on the
Civil Rights Commission Report and which stated that plaintiff
was brutal towards Negroes when in fact the report only alleged
this, the court held there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury
on the question of reckless disregard .2  The fact that the story was
based on a written report from which information was inaccurately
reported strongly suggests the existence of actual knowledge. A
much clearer case of reckless disregard is found in Thompson v. St.
Amant 9 There the defendant, a candidate for public office, made
a speech in which he accused a deputy sheriff, along with others, of
taking bribes. Recovery was allowed on proof that defendant did
not know plaintiff personally but based his clearly defamatory
statement on the sole affidavit of a man of questionable reliability.
The defamatory article in Butts was based upon the affidavit
of an insurance salesman who testified that an electrical error
allowed him to overhear a telephone conversation in which Butts
revealed the plays and plans of the Georgia team to an opposing
coach. In determining that the evidence in Butts was constitution-
ally sufficient to show reckless disregard of the truth under New
York Times, the Chief Justice alluded to the fact that "little inves-
tigative effort was expended initially, and no additional inquiries
were made even after the editors were notified by respondent and
his daughter that the account to be published was absolutely un-
true."8 0 But is it reasonable to require a publisher to investigate
every time he is notified that a story to be printed is untrue? In the
New York Times case, the plaintiff notified the Times that the state-
ments in the advertisement were false and demanded a retraction.
The Court held that "The Times' failure to retract . . . is . . .
not adequate evidence of malice for constitutional purposes." 81 In
addition, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted New
York Times to allow reporters to rely on a single source, exactly
what the Saturday Evening Post did.32 In his opinion the Chief
"Ross v. News-Journal Co., -Del.-, 228 A.2d 531 (1967).
" Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 909 (1966).
29250 La. 405, 196 So. 2d 255 (1967).
388 U.S. at 169-70.
376 U.S. at 286.
"New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Justice alluded to the fact that the Saturday Evening Post had
decided to embark on "a program of 'sophisticated muckraking'
• . . ),33 and that it had published the article "with full knowledge
of the harm that [was] . . . likely . . . [to] result . . ."' It
should be remembered that in Garrison the defendant made his
defamatory accusations in anger with the purpose of revenge, and
even though they were made without reasonable grounds to believe
them true, these facts were held not to constitute reckless disre-
gard.35 By comparing the amount of investigation held to be ade-
quate in New York Times and Garrison with the amount held to
be insufficient to avoid a finding of reckless disregard in Butts, it
is reasonable to conclude that the test of reckless disregard applied
to public figures in Butts is less rigorous than the one applied to
public officials. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that two
members of the majority that extended the New York Times stan-
dard were of the opinion that the evidence in Butts was not consti-
tutionally sufficient to show actual malice8 6 In addition, four
members of the Court felt that a different and less rigorous test
should be applied to public figures.3 7
It is submitted that the Supreme Court applied a less rigorous
standard of actual malice in Butts than that applied to public
officials. By applying a different standard the Court may be doing
what Mr. Justice Black describes as "getting itself in the same
quagmire in the field of libel in which it is now helplessly struggling
in the field of obscenity.13  It would not be unreasonably burden-
some to have different standards of proof for public figures and
public officials if these standards were clearly set forth by the
Court. The first amendment does not necessarily require that a
man who is well known because of his personal qualities be exposed
to the same amount of uncompensated libel as the man who holds
a public office, simply for the sake of having one legal standard.
Whether the first amendment requires this equal exposure at all
must be clarified by the Court in a future decision.
By failing to hold the public figure in Butts to the same stan-
dards of proof required from public officials, the Court left many
Il 388 U.S. at 169.
388 U.S. at 170.
379 U.S. at 79.
388 U.S. at 170-71.
11 388 U.S. at 155.
81 388 U.S. at 171.
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questions unanswered, not the least of which is whether this stan-
dard will apply uniformly to all public figures. It should be noted that
Butts, while a public figure in one sense, had not "thrust himself
into the vortex" of public controversy. Contrasted to this, General
Walker had voluntarily involved himself in a public controversy
by going to the University of Mississippi and speaking to the rioters.
In a great majority of the cases decided prior to Butts in which
the courts were willing to extend the New York Times rule to public
figures, these public figures had voluntarily involved themselves in
major public issues. Thus where a Nobel prize winning professor
had publicly advocated the cessation of nuclear testing, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals by dictum held him subject to the actual
malice rule. 9 On the other hand courts have been unwilling to
extend the constitutional protection where the plaintiff was not
involved in important public issues. °
It is purely subjective speculation to state that the Court intends
the reckless disregard test to be different for different types of
public figures. Yet the fact that such speculation can be rationally
made is strong evidence of the confusing nature of this decision.
In any event it is reasonable to conclude that the Court failed to
adhere to the reasoning of the Chief Justice that "differentiation
between 'public figures' and 'public officials' and adoption of sep-
arate standards of proof for each have no basis in law, logic, or
First Amendment policy,"41 because the Court in Butts ostensibly
did apply a different standard of proof than that applied to public
officials.
JAMEs R. CARPENTER, JR.
Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process-Extension to the
High School Disciplinary Proceeding
In Madera v. Board of Education,' the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of New York held the due process clause
"Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.
1966) (dictum); accord, Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times
Co., 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 368 F.2d
189 (6th Cir. 1966).
" Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct.
1964); accord, Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
" 388 U.S. at 163.
'267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
[Vol. 46
